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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : Case No. 20000428-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JOHN LEGG, JR., : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction for one 
count of Attempted Receiving or Transferring a Stolen Motor 
Vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 
41-la-1316(2) (1998), § 76-4-101 (1999), and § 76-4-102(3) 
(1999); Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999); and Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), 
in the Third Judicial District Court, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding. Jurisdiction is 
conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . See Addendum A (Judgment and Conviction) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
ISSUE: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in 
sentencing Appellant to consecutive prison terms where the record 
shows that the court did not adequately consider statutorily 
prescribed factors relevant to consecutive sentencing? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to sentence 
separate counts consecutively rather than concurrently is 
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. See State v, 
Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant John Legg, Jr.!s, ("Legg") challenge to 
consecutive sentencing is preserved on the record for appeal 
TR.") at 158. 
STATUTORY PROVISION 
The following statute is determinative of the issue on 
appeal: 
Concurrent or Consecutive Sentences — Limitations — 
Definition, Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401 (1999) : 
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been 
adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to 
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses. 
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless 
the court states in the sentence that they shall run 
consecutively. . . . (4) A court shall consider the gravity 
and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, 
and Disposition in the Court Below. 
Legg was charged by information with one count of receiving 
or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a second degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2) ; one count of 
burglary, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-202; one count of unlawful possession of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
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§ 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (Supp. 1999); one count of aggravated assault, 
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103; 
one count of failure to respond to a officerfs signal to stop, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-13.5 
(Supp. 2000); one count of criminal mischief, a class B 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-106 (1999); 
one count of theft, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1999); and one count of interference with a 
police officer, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-305 (1999). R.2-5. An arrest warrant was issued. 
R.6. 
Legg entered a guilty plea to one count of attempted 
receiving or transferring a stolen motor vehicle, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-la-1316 (2) (1998), § 
76-4-101 (1999), and § 76-4-102(3) (1999); burglary, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1999); 
and aggravated assault, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). R.124-31 (Plea); 132-33 
(Change of Plea Minute Entry). 
At sentencing, Legg requested concurrent sentencing on the 
three zero-to-five prison terms. R.158[6]. The court sentenced 
him to three consecutive terms. R.137-38; 158[9]. Legg timely 
appeals from the court's order of consecutive sentencing. R.142-
43. 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the afternoon of May 21, 1999, Legg drove a red 1995 
Lexus to the Rocky Mountain Raceway. R.69,95. Officer Hamideh, 
a uniformed West Valley City Police Officer and raceway security 
guard, observed that Legg had a red emergency light on top of the 
car. R.86. 
Legg pulled into a gravel area at the raceway. R.88. Sixty 
to eighty people were in the area. R.96. Hamideh approached 
Legg to tell him to remove the emergency light. R.88-89. 
Hamideh recognized him from an encounter with him two days 
earlier. R.88. 
Hamideh suspected the car was stolen. R.89-90. The 
driver's side window was open. R.89. With Legg still in the 
car, Hamideh asked him if he owned the car. R.90. Legg 
responded that his parents leased it for him.. Id. Hamideh 
requested proof of registration. Id. Legg produced a lease 
agreement indicating that the car was leased to a person named 
Pearlstine out of Phoenix, Arizona. Id. 
Hamideh ran the VIN number through a data base and found no 
match in either Utah or Arizona. R.91. He told Legg to turn off 
the car. Id. Hamideh also informed him that he was checking to 
see if the car was stolen. Id. Legg looked ahead and did not 
respond. Id. He then slowly started to turn the car. R.92. 
Hamideh told Legg to stop the car and to turn it off. Id. Legg 
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rolled up the window and asked to get out. R.93. Hamideh told 
Legg to stay in the car. Id. 
Hamideh called for back-up, and then heard Legg rev the 
engine. Id. Hamideh reached into the car and attempted to turn 
of the engine. Id. Legg accelerated as Hamideh held onto the 
car. R.94. Hamidehfs feet dragged along the gravel ground. 
R.93. Hamideh let go and observed Legg drive into the pit area, 
nearly missing another security guard. R.95. 
Legg parked next to a nearby motor home. R.95. He was 
discovered inside by Sheryl Strasburg, the owner of the home. 
R.71. Legg was lying on the ground and wearing her husband's t-
shirt. R.71-72. Legg pleaded for her not to tell anyone where 
he was. R.72. Ms. Strasburg walked out of the home and informed 
her husband, Lindsay Strasburg, that Legg was inside. R.73. Mr. 
Strasburg opened the door and found Legg still lying on the 
floor. R.80. Legg got up and ran out. R.81. Hamideh tackled 
Legg, took him to the ground and handcuffed him. R.98. Hamideh 
later discovered that the red Lexus was stolen from Low Book Auto 
Sales. R.99. 
At his sentencing, Legg asked for concurrent sentencing on 
each of the three zero-to-five third degree felony counts to 
which he pleaded. R.158[6]. The court was provided with a copy 
of the Pre-Sentence Report ("PSR"), and agreed that Leggfs 
juvenile history should not be considered. R.158[3]. Legg noted 
that he only had one prior felony conviction as an adult in 1987. 
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R.158[4]. He admitted to a significant drug problem. R.158[5]. 
He also told the court he did not intentionally hurt Hamideh, but 
rather it was his recklessness in continuing to drive while 
Hamideh held on to his car that resulted in his injuries. 
R.158[5]. Finally, Legg told the court that he was emotionally 
distraught on the day of this incident due to the death of his 
eight month old son, which caused him to fall back into drugs and 
behave irresponsibly. R.158[7]. Up until his son's death, he 
noted that he was not taking drugs and was living responsibly. 
Id. 
The court imposed consecutive sentences nonetheless based 
solely on the fact he placed Officer Hamideh at "serious risk." 
R.158[9] . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court abused its discretion where the record shows 
that it considered only one of the four statutorily prescribed 
factors relevant to consecutive sentencing. See Utah Code Ann. § 
76-3-401(4) (1999) ("[sentencing] court shall consider the 
gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history, 
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant in 
determining whether to impose consecutive sentences"); see also 
State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (finding abuse of 
discretion in consecutive sentencing where sentencing court did 
not give "adequate weight to certain mitigating circumstances"); 
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State v. McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (abuse of 
discretion occurs when sentencing judge does not consider all 
legally relevant factors) (citation omitted) . 
ARGUMENT 
ISSUE: THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES, 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4) (1999) provides that a 
"[sentencing] court shall consider the gravity and circumstances 
of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose 
consecutive sentences." 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that a sentencing court is 
required to consider all of the statutorily prescribed factors 
set forth in section 76-3-401(4), noting: 
Under Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1), "[a] court shall 
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of 
more than one felony offense, whether to impose 
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses." 
We have stated, "The statute ... favors concurrent 
sentences." State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1301 (Utah 
1993) (citing § 76-3-401(1)). In determining whether 
to impose consecutive sentences, the court is required 
to "consider the gravity and circumstances of the 
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative 
needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(4). 
GalU, 967 P.2d at 938 (emphasis added); see also State v. 
McCovev, 803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) P[a]n abuse of 
discretion results when the [sentencing] judge 'fails to consider 
all legally relevant factors1")(quotation omitted). 
The wording of the consecutive sentencing statute also 
7 
indicates that a trial court's consideration of all the factors 
in section 76-3-401(4) is mandatory, not advisory, since it 
states that a "court shall consider the gravity of the 
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and 
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-
401(4) (emphasis added); see State v. Arellano, 964 P.2d 1167, 
1170 (Utah App. 1998) ("statutory language 'shall1 is not 
advisory; it is mandatory") (citing Board of Educ. v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983) (strictly interpreting 
"shall" as mandatory) ) . 
In light of the foregoing, the Utah Supreme Court has 
reversed consecutive sentencing orders where the sentencing judge 
did not give "adequate weight," Galli, 967 P.2d at 938, to 
mitigating information falling under any one of the factors set 
forth in § 76-3-401(4), let alone where the judge wholly fails to 
give any weight to such relevant information. For example, in 
Galli, the defendant ("Galli") was involved in three aggravated 
robberies. Id. at 932. In the first robbery, Galli pointed a 
gun at a bookstore clerk and took approximately $250 in cash. 
Id. In the second, Galli and another man robbed a movie theater 
attendant at gunpoint of $900. Id. In the third, Galli again 
robbed a tool store clerk at gunpoint of $180. Id. 
Galli was apprehended in Washington state almost one month 
after the third robbery occurred. Id. He voluntarily spoke with 
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detect i v e s , a dm i 111 n g t o a 1 ] t h r e e robber i e s . I d . P r i o r t o 
t r I a 1, G a 111 ' a b s c o i i d e df" f r o n L 11: I e j I :i r :i s d i :: t i o i i, I_d • I I e ; / a s 
captured three years later in Minnesota and returned to Utah, 
whc-; : -- - .:.' : O , . ! • • • ' i .v - * ' . ; • ie.s o f 
aggravated robbery an ! 'was sentenced to three consecutive five-
t " • • r * - - " • • i i . 
Locking CIL each of the statutory factors enumerated in 
section 76-j-40i • •] , the Court reversed the consecutive 
sentences, stating that the " oiges ™^ »v noi have given 
adequate wPiaht t -.- certain mitigating circumstance:: i d. a1-
Court noted that although GaJli used d a.;n, h-v did not. iniure 
an* • :•- '. : : ••.: . : e' • • • i o a l • : • • ' t . . ..g 
serrous iniury; and the amour it cf "money take .;•-; 
r e : , : - i -.^-l •; •
 : •;._ 
fa:, tn regard UJ •.^ I..,,.'3 criminal history, ^he Court noted 
tha+" it consisted of on l w m:r'i-r traffic offenses and a 
misdemeanor itelt convict.;.^n . ^ i, i^reover, ^ :..-• Court explained 
that althouah Galli had absconded from the jurisdiction for three 
>e~;s, v <• • . 1 i. 
Accordingly, —he Court stated trint " ' ors fact : . .; . lumping 
could " - 1 : • n• • - ^ h an norn i n a ] si I p p o r t f :>r 11: Ie :i niposi t:i oi l 
o f c o r i o e t u t . . .-J b e f i t e n c t ^ . " I d . 
N e x t , i n c o n s i d e r a t i o n o f G a l l i f s c h a r a c t e r , t h e C o u r t 
r e a s o n e d t h a t c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s w e r e n o t a p p r o p r i a t e w h e r e 
$ 
Galli "voluntarily confessed and admitted responsibility for the 
crimes he committed." Id. In addition, the Court noted that 
Galli expressed a "commitment and hope to improve himself, " as 
well as recognized that Galli, although a fugitive from justice, 
"obeyed the law [and] helped his neighbors" while in Minnesota 
and thereby demonstrated that he was a "productive individual." 
Id. 
Finally, as-to Galli's rehabilitative needs, the Court 
recognized that his good behavior in Minnesota "show[ed] that he 
has the ability to improve himself and become a productive, law-
abiding citizen once he has paid his debt to society." Id. ; see 
also State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1993) (vacating 
consecutive sentence where trial court did not "sufficiently 
consider defendant's rehabilitative needs in light of his extreme 
youth and the absence of prior violent crimes" and thereby robbed 
Board of Pardons of discretion to parole defendant sooner than 
the twenty-four year minimum mandatory sentence); State v. Smith, 
909 P.2d 236, 244-45 (Utah 1995) (trial court abused discretion 
in imposing consecutive sentences because effect was to impose 
sixty year minimum mandatory sentence, depriving Board of Pardons 
discretion to decide maximum sentence based on defendant's future 
conduct and rehabilitation). 
As in Galli, the trial court abused its discretion because 
it failed to give "adequate weight" to the factors set forth in § 
76-3-401(4). Indeed, the trial court's abuse of discretion is 
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ever, m o r e p r o n o u n r ^ d t v.,.iri t \iri: ;n Gal 1 i h e c a u ^ - it tailed to 
c o n s i d e r t h r e e o: * :.• . -i • • -. , , • - \ . . J • i -
R a t h e r , the c o u r t m a d e f i n d i n q s as tu uiiiy on* the q r a v . ' y ctni 
76-3-4U1 - 'ie Lrjcii L-,LH * .; findings in rapport ui. its 
conseci 11:i \ e sentei ic:i i 1 g ordei: are as follows: 
It is the judgment and sentence of this Court that you 
serve the term provided by law in the Utah State Prison 
of zero to five years for each of the three separate 
Third Degree Felony crimes to which you pled guilty. 
Mr. Legg, had it been something other than the 
serious risk that you placed on the officer who was 
seeking to do his duty here, which could have resulted 
in his death rather easily, quite frankly; had it been 
something other than that - and I don't ascribe to you 
a malevolent intent to do harm to this specific 
officer. But the nature of the conduct was such that 
it was absolutely and totally out of control, Mr. Legg. 
And the mere fact that the officer survived this with 
injuries no greater than he received was fortuitous. 
It had nothing to do with your conduct. 
That sort of conduct, Mr. Legg, whether you are 
grieving the loss of a son or strung out on drugs, is 
absolutely unacceptable. And you 1 inderstand that, of 
course. So, the consequence of all of i t is that you 
must now pay your debt. 
It is my order that you serve the terms 
consecutively and not concurrently, Mr, Legg. 
F . • [ - • • l . 
As an J nitial matter, the court abused its discretion i n 
fa^li- 7 1 ' ' * id^uat^ weight/' Galli, 967 P.2d at 9^ c,, LO a_,l 
tru_ factor., i ii !i.. tiqat. ^ -,n , tl le 'gravity and circumstances of 
the offenses.'7 Utah Code Ann. *'; 7 6-^-40 J : leather, i1" focused 
only on the possib . - . .-•.., . :
 : . . ., ar id 
gave minor attention to the fact that Legg was grieving for hus 
H 
dead infant son and was under the influence of drugs when he 
committed the acts. R.159[9]. 
For example, the court did not consider the actual, limited 
extent of the injuries sustained by Hamideh, which amounted to 
minor scrapes on his calves and right hand plus small tears in 
his uniform. R.95; see, e.g., Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (although 
defendant committed three armed robberies, fact that he used 
pellet gun incapable of inflicting serious injury mitigated 
against consecutive sentencing). 
The court also did not give adequate consideration to the 
fact that Legg was not armed during this incident, or that 
burglary and receiving-of-a-stolen-vehicle are non-violent 
property crimes. Compare Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (vacating 
consecutive sentences although defendant committed three armed 
robberies, crimes of violence involving people). Moreover, Legg 
did not use the car as a weapon. As Hamideh testified, Legg 
began to drive off slowly when Hamideh grabbed hold of Legg' s 
head. R.92-94. At that time, Legg accelerated and Hamideh 
continued to hold on, getting dragged in the process. R.94. 
Hamideh never testified that Legg aimed the car at him and drove 
as if to intentionally hurt him. See generally R.85-110 
(Hamideh's Testimony at Preliminary Hearing). At most, Legg's 
actions constitute recklessness and do not merit consecutive 
sentencing. Compare Galli, 967 P.2d at 938 (vacating consecutive 
sentences although defendant committed intentional armed 
12 
robbery). 
of discretion because it railed = o consicier nhe remaining three 
needs. See Utah Code Ann. § l*,-^-4n. - indeed, nothing :; "he 
court's findi ngs addresses any of these factors, See generally 
R.158[8-9]. "An abuse of discretion results when the 
[sentencinqi iudge 'tails tr> mnsider a]! lega 11 y relevant 
factors, tate v. N^^vey, . • .. ; . 54, 1 2 35 (I II :al I 1 9 90) 
(quotation ^mitte rider Galli, -annot be said that the 
t: . . \> :\, r . :i ] ;y j: rescribed 
factors where J* n d not address them in the first place. 967 
F . . cit 938 . krc:^ : *. . 'rederi ck1 s conseci ltd ve 
1
 But see State M Scl lweitzer, 94 3 P . 2d 64 9, 652 (U ta 1 I App . 
1997) (holding that defendant did not "show that the tri a 1 court 
failed to consider [consecutive sentencing] factors [where] 
mitigating evidence was presented to the trial court through 
defendant's testimony; his counsel's arguments; letters from [the 
victims], defendant's therapist, and defendant's attorney; and 
the Pre-sentence Investigation Report"). 
As in Schweitzer, all mitigating informatioi i was before 
Judge Frederick in the form of the PSR, statements from defense 
counsel and Legg, and the preliminary hearing transcript. 
However, Schweitzer is factually distinguishable from the present 
case, compelling the conclusion that Judge Frederick did not 
adequately consider all statutory factors relevant to sentencing. 
The defendant in Schweitzer committed a far more egregious set of 
acts which supported the sentencing court's conclusion that he 
needed consecutive sentencing because he was "'a clear and 
present danger.1" Id. 
There, the defendant was involved in. a long-time 
relationship with his girlfriend, Kathy, and had a chxiu ^ ; . 
her. Id. at 650. He was abusive and controlling throughout the 
relationship. Id. When the relationship ended, he threw he/; 
into a wal 1 , choked her, called her vulgar names, and threatened 
] 3 
sentencing order amounts to an abuse of discretion. Id. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing, Legg respectfully requests this 
Court to vacate his consecutive sentence and remand for 
resentencing to concurrent terms. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this Xf**- day of October, 2000. 
CATHERINE E. LILLY (J 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
to shoot her in the head. Id. Defendant and Kathy became 
involved in a custody battle over their child. Id. Kathy 
obtained a restraining order against defendant after he threw a 
rock through her window and called her, leaving a vulgar message. 
Id. Kathy consequently obtained a protective order and custody 
of their child. Id. 
Defendant violated the protective order and was reprimanded 
by the court. Id. Defendant went to the home of a friend, and 
made several statements such as, "'If I had a week to live, the 
first thing I would do is go kill Kathy.1" Id. Defendant began 
drinking, consuming 10-12 beers and prescription medications. 
Id. Defendant and his friend then went to a restaurant. Id. 
Defendant was agitated, drunk, and driving extremely recklessly 
on the way. Id. 
At the restaurant, defendant had three more mixed drinks. 
Id. Defendant told the manager that he would kill Kathy. Id. 
Defendant tried to use his cell phone and slammed it on the 
table, then threw it, when it would not work. Id. Defendant 
then threw a bar stool and a glass table at a locked door. Id. 
Defendant's friend tried to remove him from the bar. Id. 
Defendant pulled a concealed hunting knife and stabbed his friend 
in the groin, causing a nearly fatal, deep wound. Id. The 
manager called 911 while two other employees attempted to 
intervene. Id. Defendant hit one in the face and brandished his 
knife at the other. Id. Defendant left the restaurant swinging 
the knife at anyone who came near him. Id. 
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ADDENDUM A 
\M^ ( QfcO 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JOHN JR t,H !i ., 
r>' ndant 
Custody: Sail Lake d 
MI MUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COM. 
Case No: 991910690 F? 
J-..dg. : -NTS FREDERICK 
Ddte: A p n i. ,. ^  .:: 
ENTEncD IN REOIGTRY 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cmdyb DATE 
Prosecutor: JOHNSON T™ IN K 
Defendant 
D e f e n d a n t ' s A t t o r n e y is,- : FINLAYSON, DAVID V 
OF JUDBMEijiTS 
DEFEN^AIM' . . i- r JRMA":' 1 <.)U 
D a t e o f b i n . ; * ; De 'ernh»-'r ] =), 1968 
V i d e c 
T a p e •. ;. • . : '\\i\w <'i mill 
991910690, r-^260962 
ULEGG. JOHNJR 
in 
1 - EMPTED RECEIVE OR TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE ( i Tided) 
Degree Felony 
Plea: Gu i11 y * i s p o s i t: i o n i 0 2 • 18 / 2 000 G u i 1L y Plea 
2 , BURGLARY OF A. BUILDING (amended) 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/18/2000 Guilty Plea 
I GGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 02/18/2000 Guilty Plea 
SP •• 'E PRISON 
3rd 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED RECEIVE OR 
TRANSFER STOLEN VEHICLE a 3rd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in 
the Utah State Prison. 
Based on the defendant1 s conviction - BURGLARY OF A BUILDING a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years :i n the "*' -u Stat Prison. 
Page l I! ml I H ' i ' I II / 
Case No: 991910690 
Date: Apr 14, 2000 
Based on the defendant's conviction of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3rd 
Degree Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term 
of not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
COMMITMENT is to begin immediately. 
To the SALT LAKE County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Terms to run consecutive. 
SENTENCE RECOMMENDATION NOTE 
The Court grants credit for 314 days time served. The Court 
recommends defendant receive substance abuse therapy at the prison. 
SENTENCE TRUST 
Paae 2 (last) C0133 
